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Abstract 
 
This paper uses a novelty dataset of poor households in peri-urban areas in Vietnam to 
estimate impacts of small loans on child schooling. The Probit and Negative Binomial model 
estimates roughly indicate no strong evidence of the effect, especially of informal credit. 
Formal credit is likely to have positive impacts on child schooling, but its effect is not strong 
enough to be conclusive. The paper suggests that to obtain the target of sustainable poverty 
reduction, easing access to formal credit sources as well as exempting tuition and other 
school fees are necessary to keep poor children at schools longer.   
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1. Introduction 
It is widely recognised that human capital plays an important role in productivity, earnings, 
and sustainable poverty reduction (Maldonado & Gonzalez-Vega, 2008; Maitra, 2003). 
Education not only passes specific knowledge to students but also enhances skills in 
acquiring new knowledge (Rosenzweig, 2010). However, the poor encounter two key 
development issues: income constraints and low education. These lead to a vicious circle of 
poverty. Income constraints result in low education investment and hence low education 
attainment. Low education results in low productivity and then low income. Hence, child 
schooling receives a lot of attention in development strategies and is considered a solution to 
breaking the vicious circle of poverty and to enhancing future development. However, 
education investment by many households in developing countries is insufficient, especially 
by poor households.  
 
Demand for education relies on parents’ motivation, income constraints, and competing 
demands for children’s time (Maldonado & Gonzalez-Vega, 2008). Under perfect financial 
markets, credit would be a tool to guarantee full investment in education. The 
underdevelopment of financial markets and income constraints, however, are the main 
reasons for deficient education for children in developing countries (Edmonds, 2006; Jacoby 
& Skoufias, 1997; Ranjan, 2001). Due to credit constraints, many households are not able to 
borrow or borrow insufficiently so they may pull their children out of school or ask their 
children to reduce study time and go to work, especially when households face adverse 
shocks (Kurosaki, 2002). Thus, access to credit would help households to smooth 
consumption without the need to cut children’s schooling.  
 
Moreover, during the economic transition in Vietnam cuts to public subsidies in 
education have led to an increase in private education costs (Cloutier, Cockburn & Decaluwe, 
2008). As a result, households, especially the poor, may need other external support, 
including credit, for their children’s education. This paper aims to evaluate the impacts of 
household credit on child schooling for the poor in peri-urban areas of Ho Chi Minh City 
(HCMC), Vietnam. The paper has two goals: First, it examines whether borrowing keeps 
children in school longer than without borrowing. Second, the paper examines whether the 
sources of credit and gender of children matter in impacts on child schooling. This paper 
finds that although small loans may affect levels of education spending, but they just bring 
slight benefits to the poor’s child schooling. This is because the loan amounts are too small, 
especially amounts of informal credit, to cover ‘big’ lump sums of education expenses for 
initial enrolments, and hence small loans do not affect parents’ longer-term decisions about 
their children’s schooling.  
 
This paper is organised as follows: The next section reviews the literature on credit 
impacts on child schooling. Section 3 discusses estimation methods. Section 4 reports 
estimation results and Section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
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2.  Literature on credit impact on child schooling 
Household affects child schooling in two ways:1one beneficial and one adverse. First, the 
beneficial impact is that household credit enables households to earn more; higher income 
will push up household consumption which further increases the demand for healthcare and 
child schooling (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010). The credit could be spent on schooling 
(school fees, textbooks, schooling materials, uniforms and other schooling expenditure) as 
well as on improving child nutrition and shortening their sickness time by allowing children 
to take medicines promptly. As a result, the spending helps keep children at school. Similarly, 
Maldonado and Gonzalez-Vega (2008, p. 2,441) classify this channel of effect as ‘positive’, 
and name this effect ‘income effect’. The credit helps generate household income (positive 
impact) and then positively influences the demand for education. Moreover, education is a 
normal good, and thus it has a positive income-effect. As a result, an increase in education 
spending will positively affect child schooling. Therefore, access to credit allows households 
to smooth their consumption and then improve their decisions in favour of more education for 
their children (Maldonado, Gonzalez-Vega & Romeo, 2002, p. 29).  
 Inadequate schooling, a situation when children are required to drop out of schools to 
help their parents or to cut down household spending, is often attributed to lack of access to 
credit (Dehejia & Gatti, 2002; Edmonds, 2006; Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997; Ranjan, 2001). 
Households facing adverse shocks and having insufficient access to credit may withdraw 
children from school to reduce household expenditure and send children to work in order to 
smooth household consumption (Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997; Kurosaki, 2002). On the other 
hand, when households are able to borrow adequately at reasonable interest rates, they may 
not need child labour; then children may stay at schools longer. For example, according to 
CGAP(2003), there appears to be a large differential in child schooling between two groups 
of borrowers and non-borrowers in Bangladesh; almost all girls of Grameen Bank borrowers 
have some years of schooling, whereas only 60% of non-borrowers’ girls have some years of 
education. For boys, 81% and 54% respectively for borrowers and non-borrowers households 
have some schooling. Many other studies show that compared to non-clients of microfinance, 
enrolment rates and years of schooling are improved for microfinance clients’ children after 
joining microfinance programs (Barnes, 2001; Chen & Snodgrass, 2001; Morduch, 1998; Pitt 
& Khandker, 1998). 
The second way in which microcredit affects child schooling is a child labour or 
adverse effect. Borrowed money is spent on family businesses, which lead to an increase in 
household employment. This would undermine children’s schooling because children have to 
replace their mothers in caring for their younger siblings, in looking after animals, and in 
doing housework and farming (Maldonado & Gonzalez-Vega, 2008, p. 2,441). Consequently, 
children may encounter adverse effects of credit on schooling; children quit school 
immediately or reduce time for schooling. Consequently, their academic performance 
gradually worsens; children may repeat classes or find themselves discouraged from staying 
                                                 
1  Generally, loans to the poor are often small so the terms ‘household credit’ and ‘microcredit’ are 
used interchangeably in this paper. 
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at school longer, and eventually drop out. Furthermore, child labour and schooling are 
exclusively parents’ decisions (Edmonds, 2006); so when parents need more labour to 
increase family income and smooth consumption, they may pull their children out of school.  
Moreover, the child labour effect could result from requirements of immediate loan 
repayment. Loans to the poor often have higher interest rates (except subsidised loans) and 
short-term repayment conditions as discussed in Doan, Gibson and Holmes (2010). 
Borrowers therefore require high returns to pay high interest rates in a short period of time. 
To ensure repayment, poor borrowers may try to reduce their business costs by employing 
their own labour, including children, without wages. Consequently, children from borrowing 
households may be pulled out of school. For instance, Beegle, Dehijia and Gatti (2004) in a 
study on Vietnam find that households borrowing from higher interest rate sources were more 
likely to have child labour. They suggest that to increase child schooling requires facilitating 
access to credit with lower interest rates.  
Empirical studies of credit impacts on child schooling provide mixed evidence on these 
two types of effect. Pitt and Khandker (1998) find that girl schooling increased when 
households borrowed from Grameen Bank, but when households borrowed from other 
microcredit programs no positive impacts on girl schooling were observed. In contrast, 
Hazarika and Sarangi (2008) in a study on rural Malawi find that children are more likely to 
work rather than go to school if their households have borrowed. In the case of Bangladesh, 
Morduch (1998) finds no effect on child schooling. Similarly, in the same country Islam and 
Choe (2009) even detect significantly adverse impacts of microcredit on child schooling.  
 
3. Analytical framework 
3.1  Data 
A sample of 411 borrowing and non-borrowing households was interviewed in early 2008 in 
the peri-urban District 9, Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) Vietnam.2 Since our focus is on 
microcredit impacts on poor households, the sample was selected from a list of poor 
households whose initial income per capita was below the HCMC general poverty line of 
VND 6 million (approximately US$1 per day).3 We employed a two-step sampling, first 
selecting wards and then households. The target sample size was set at 500 households, 
including 100 reserves, to achieve a realised sample of 400. In fact, 411 households were 
successfully interviewed, accounting for 26% of the total number of poor households in each 
of the selected wards in the district. The interviewed sample provides 304 borrowing 
households and 107 non-borrowing households, with 2,062 members, 955 (46.3%) males and 
1,102 (53.7%) females, including 483 school-aged children. The sample is likely to be 
representative for the poor group whose initial income per capita is below the poverty line at 
                                                 
2  HCMC has 24 Districts. District 9 has the 5th lowest population density, with a population of 
227,816 (in 2008).  
3  The list was provided by the District Department of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs. 
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the survey time in the district but will not be representative for Ho Chi Minh City nor for 
Vietnam. 
The survey was designed to collect data on household and individual demographic-
economic variables, commune characteristics, household durable and fixed assets, child 
schooling and education expenditure, healthcare, food, non-food, housing expenditure, and 
borrowing activities. We also utilised GPS receivers to collect data on locations of 
households and facilities in order to measure distances from each household to facilities. 
 
3.2  Estimation methodological issues 
The most difficult part of impact evaluations is to separate out the causal effect of credit from 
selection and reverse causation biases which are common to nearly all statistical evaluations 
(Armendariz & Morduch, 2010). For example, the longsighted and richer households often 
have easier access to credit and one has to ask whether household credit really affects the 
households’ child schooling, or is it that the more education-motivated and richer parents 
simply are more likely to send their children to school as well as having easier access to 
credit. Therefore, there is a potential for selection bias here and for this reason the inference 
from estimated impacts on outcomes could be misleading.  
In the literature on credit impact evaluation as, selection biases from non-random 
placement of credit and self-selection into credit participation by borrowers have received 
much attention since these may cause overestimates of impacts (Amin, Rai, & Topa, 2003). 
Apart from randomisation methods (e.g. Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, & Kinnan, 2009), 
other strategies and methods to reduce bias have been used, including treating new clients as 
a control group, examining discontinuities in client eligibility, potential or future clients and 
fixed effects (see Coleman, 1999, 2006; Islam, 2010; Morduch, 1998; Mosley, 1997; Pitt & 
Khandker, 1998; Roodman & Morduch, 2009). As a variant on these non-random methods, a 
purposely selected sample is used here to try to reduce the bias. All the households in our 
sample are poor, with initial income per capita under VND6 million (about US$1 per day) 
which makes them eligible for preferred (low interest rate and easy loan conditions) credits 
from the government. Thus, the non-random placement of credit borrowing should not be 
seriously problematic. In addition, the selection bias may be reduced by controlling for 
household pre-treatment income and parents’ education, as suggested by Mosley (1997).  
Some studies on schooling employ Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) or Instrumental 
Variables (IV) (e.g. Behrman & Knowles, 1999; Maitra, 2003) to address selection and 
reverse causation biases. Demographic and educational characteristics of household heads, 
their jobs, household composition, and physical characteristics of dwellings are used as 
instruments. However, none of the studies applied the rigorous test for weak instruments 
suggested by Stock and Yogo (2002). Although the studies applied the test for endogeneity, 
the test is not able to ensure whether the instruments are good enough. For IV models, testing 
weak instruments using Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) models is crucial (Murray, 
2006); thus, using weak IVs could lead to upward biases, and the IV or 2SLS estimates could 
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be worse than estimates by conventional estimators which treat credit participation as 
exogenous. In the current data, good instruments which affect credit participation but not 
child schooling are not available, we therefore apply only conventional Probit and Negative 
Binomial (NB) models.4 
 
Probit and Negative Binomial model 
Two outcomes of child schooling are examined here: current enrolment and the education 
gap. Analysis of the current enrolment is conducted using the standard Probit model. 
However, one single indicator e.g. grade attainment or current enrolment does not represent 
fully children’s schooling because it does not indicate how well children did at school or 
whether or not children were grade-repeated. The education gap enables capture of this 
information, and it also represents how well children did at school. So the education gap may 
better reflect longer-term effects, while the current enrolment may reflect the immediate 
effect. The education gap is expressed as follows: 
Education gap = expected years of schooling – actual years of schooling 
 
 
 
The education gap can take positive integers from 0 to 12, thus the outcome of education gap 
is Poisson distributed, and a count data model is appropriate.  
The count data model is well established (Cameron & Trivedi, 1986; Greene, 2008; 
Hausman, Hall & Griliches, 1984; Winkelmann, 2008, amongst others). Tabulating data on 
the outcome (Y) is a simple strategy to see the outcome distribution (Appendix 2). The 
smaller is the mean, the higher the proportion of zeros, so zero observations are an important 
feature of count data (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009).  
The Poisson model is:  μ=E(y|x) = exp(x’β)           (1) 
where Y denotes the outcome (occurrences), Y= 0, 1, 2, …., N, and y(t, t+Δt) denote the 
number of events/occurrences observed in the interval (t, t+Δt). Then the number of 
occurrences in an interval of a given length is Poisson distributed with the probability density 
as follows: 
Pr(Y= y) = e-μ .μy /y!   where    y= 0, 1, 2, …., N 
Conditional mean and variance of Y equal μ or Var(Y) = E(Y)=μ. When controlling for some 
exogenous variables x, the parameter μ is now specified as follows: 
   μ= exp(x’β)        (2) 
                                                 
4  Some potential IVs such as distance to banks, pre-treatment income and assets are used to conduct weak IV 
test, and all proved to be weak instruments. 
           0              if age ≤ 6 
Expected years of schooling =      (age - 6)  if 6 < age ≤ 18 
           12            if age >18 
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The Poisson model is based on two assumptions. The first assumption is that events 
occur independently over time. The second assumption (called equidispersion, the key 
assumption of this model) is the equality of conditional mean and variance of dependent 
variable Y. In reality, equidispersion is commonly violated since count data is often 
overdispersed, that is the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2009, p. 556). The distribution often has a longer right tail and the variance-mean 
ratio exceeds one. The presence of unobserved heterogeneity is one of the most common 
reasons for the violation to the second assumption. The Negative Binomial (NB) model can 
be a solution to this problem. 
The NB model has Gamma distribution:  
μ= gamma(φ, v)    (3) 
where φ is mean and v is a precision parameter.  
    E[μ]=φ and Var(μ) = [1/v].φ2 
∫ === μμμ dfyYyY )(]|Pr[]Pr[     (4) 
With mean of dependent variable E[Y] = φ = exp(Xβ), and 
Var(Y) = φ + (1/v).φ2= E[Y] + (1/v). (E[Y])2 = E[Y] [1+ (1/v). (E[Y])]     (5) 
Var(Y)=E[Y].(1+α.E[Y]) 
Because φ > 0 and v > 0 then Var(Y) > E(Y), and thus the model allows for overdispersion.  
The test for Poisson models is based on tests for alpha α = 0 against α ≠ 0. The Wald 
test is used to test the H0: Poisson (μ= E[Y]) against HA: Negative binomial model with mean 
μ and variance μ(1+α.μ). These two different parameterisations (Poisson and NB) imply 
different assumptions about functional form of heteroscedasticity. In reality, the outcome 
distribution is commonly overdispersed so the second assumption of the Poisson model is 
violated. Therefore, the NB models are preferable to Poisson models. This is the case for our 
data on the education gap where we have a conditional mean of 1.145 and variance of 2.190 
(Appendix 2).  
 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
To corroborate the Probit and NB estimation findings, the PSM (propensity score matching) 
method is also used. PSM is able to reduce the bias in the conventional estimates since it only 
compares the treatment group’s outcome with that of a similar control group. With PSM, 
matched comparison and treatment groups are similar in terms of propensity scores built on 
observable characteristics (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002). To evaluate the impact of credit 
participation on child schooling, PSM compares the schooling outcomes of children from 
borrowing households to what they would have had if their families did not borrow. Children 
from non-borrowers (who have the same or similar characteristics, such as demographic and 
9 
socio-economic conditions which affect both credit participation and child schooling) are 
assumed to have the same outcomes that borrowers’ children would have had if their parents 
had not borrowed. These children from non-borrower households can be used to generate a 
control group. So, what we need to do is to first estimate the propensity scores for each 
borrowing and non-borrowing household using household-level data and then merge the 
scores with the child-level data. The child-level data with the scores enables us to estimate 
the average treatment effects on child schooling using the PSM method. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
Descriptive analysis 
Unconditional mean differences in child schooling of child group aged 6-18 years old 
between borrowers and non-borrowers are presented in Table 1. Roughly, children from 
borrowing households are better off (higher enrolment and lower education gap) than their 
non-borrower counterparts. However, the difference is insignificant. The difference in current 
enrolment between borrowers’ children and non-borrowers’ children is not very obvious.  See 
Figure 1.  The education gap may reflect outcomes of longer-term investment in schooling, 
since higher level education needs larger amounts of investment, and the poor are often both 
income-constrained and credit-constrained. Moreover, during the socio-economic reforms in 
Vietnam, cuts in public subsidies for higher education levels have pushed private education 
costs up. For these reasons, the education gap widens as child age increases.  See Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Enrolment rate by age and borrowing status 
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Figure 2: Education gap by age and by borrowing status 
 
 
Table 1: Mean values of some key variables and t-values for equal means for the group of 6 to 
18 years old children by borrowing status 
Variables Borrowers Non-borrowers t-value  Mean Std Mean  Std 
Head’s gender (male=1)  0.528 0.500 0.606 0.491 1.43 
Parents’ highest  education (years) 5.551 3.333 5.452 3.585 0.26 
Head married (yes=1) 0.723 0.448 0.730 0.446 0.16 
Head’s age (years) 50.501 13.762 57.625 15.300 4.30**
Household size (persons) 6.087 2.743 6.433 3.335 0.97 
Younger siblings under 6 years (yes=1) 0.280 0.449 0.240 0.429 0.82 
Children from 6 to 18 years old 1.942 0.963 2.096 1.187 1.22 
Members from 18 to 60 years old 3.325 1.670 3.202 2.002 0.57 
Members older than 60 (yes=1) 0.293 0.456 0.529 0.502 4.33**
Distance to nearest aged-range school 1.247 1.481 1.298 1.451 0.31 
Child’s gender (male=1) 0.451 0.498 0.5481 0.500 1.75+ 
Child’s age (years) 12.823 3.708 13.096 3.693 0.67 
Value of durable assets acquired over 24 months, land 
and house (in log) 
13.149 1.180 12.702 1.929 2.25* 
Pre-survey income per capita (in log) 8.115 0.234 8.102 0.389 0.32 
Enrolment rate (children aged 6-18) 0.784 0.413 0.760 0.429 0.51 
Education gap (children aged 6-18) 1.061 2.216 1.346 2.392 1.10 
Enrolment rate (children aged 6-14) 0.917 0.276 0.911 0.288 0.16 
Education gap (children aged 6-14) 0.265 0.750 0.429 0.951 1.20 
Enrolment rate (children aged 15-18) 0.577 0.496 0.583 0.498 0.08 
Education gap (children aged 15-18) 2.289 3.028 2.417 3.052 0.25 
Notes: t-value statistically significant at 10% (+), 5% (*), and 1% (**).  
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Estimation results 
Some current studies on schooling in Vietnam show that expenditure per capita (a proxy for 
household permanent income) is a good predictor of child schooling in Vietnam (Beegle, 
Dehijia, & Gatti, 2004; Behrman & Knowles, 1999). Accordingly, controlling for pre-
treatment income, and assets as proxies for household wealth,is necessary. Furthermore, 
controlling for these initial variables can reduce selection bias as suggested by Mosley (1997) 
and can also avoid the problem of reverse causation bias that may occur if current income or 
expenditure is used.  
 
Probit and Negative Binomial estimation results 
Details of the education gap outcome distribution are presented in Appendix 2. The 
conditional mean is smaller than the variance so the distribution of the education gap is over-
dispersed and has a longer right tail. Intuitively, the negative binomial models (NB) are 
appropriate in this case; however, to confirm this, we also run Poisson models and test for 
overdispersion, all the test results are statistically significant at the 1% level regardless of 
different alternative specifications; thus, the Poisson models are strongly rejected in favour of 
the NB model. The appropriateness of applying NB model is confirmed by the Wald test 
results (test for α = zero) in Tables 3, 5, 7, and 8.5 The test results imply that using NB 
improves the fit of the models, and the NB standard errors are smaller than the Poisson 
standard errors giving indicate more efficiency gains from NB models.  
The reported results start with estimates for child schooling using maximum likelihood 
Probit for current enrolment and maximum likelihood NB for education gap. Next, we 
consider whether the impacts for boys and girls are different. Following that, the impacts of 
different sources of credit are reported. Finally, we test whether or not the combination of 
credit and parental education (and income) helps child schooling.  
In each model, we include all children aged 6-18 years old. There are likely potential 
sources of biases that are between-household selection (i.e. which household sends children 
to school or their children stay longer at school), and within-household selection (i.e. which 
children are kept at school or receive more investment from their parents). The first problem 
can be addressed by controlling for household characteristics including household initial 
income, initial assets, parental education, credit participation, head’s gender, number of 
children, distance to the nearest school, household dwelling locations, and especially 
household weights placed on each child.6  For the second source of bias, we control further 
                                                 
5  Discussion on procedure for the test and choice of parameterisation is presented in Appendix 3. 
Alpha (α) can be interpreted as a measure of the variance of heterogeneity. 
6  Weights (scores) were estimated using PSM method, equal weight was placed on within-
household children, but different weights were placed on between-household children. Weighted 
Probit and NB model estimates are not much different from those of the unweighted estimates 
since there are only about 1.05 children (aged 6 to 18) per household. The weighted estimates are 
reported in Appendix 4; 5, Appendix 6 and Appendix 7. 
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for child characteristics including child’s gender, age and birth order. Schooling performance 
by children within a household may be influenced by child’s IQ and parents’ motivation 
(Bowles & Gentis, 2002). These factor effects can be captured by parental education, 
household income and assets. However, this leads to another potential problem that is the 
unobserved determinants of schooling, which are correlated across children within 
households. Thus, it may result in biased estimated standard errors (Deaton, 1997), and to 
correct the biased standard errors, robust clustered standard errors are estimated.  
 
(a) Maximum Likelihood Probit for current enrolment and Maximum Likelihood 
Negative Binomial model for education gap  
The estimates in Tables 2 and 3 indicate that the probability of current enrolment and the size 
of the education gap are not significantly influenced by household credit. This finding is 
similar to Cameron and Heckman (1998) and Carneiro and Heckman (2002); these studies 
show that family background factors rather than short-term credit constraints determine 
education outcomes. The finding is also consistent with the relevant literature (Morduch, 
1998; Manski, 1997; Kane, 1994) which indicates that credit participation or credit 
constraints do not significantly affect school attendance. Doan, Gibson and Holmes (2011) 
used the same dataset of the current paper and indicated that education expenditure was 
positively influenced by credit participation for households who already sent their children to 
schools, and it is likely that level of education expenditure is a current choice, while a 
decision regarding sending children to school and children’s academic attainment reflects 
longer-term investments, and as such is affected by family background and economic 
conditions. Our finding agrees with Keane and Wolfin (2001) who point out that credit would 
have greater effects on consumption and labour supply than school enrolment. 
 
Table 2: Marginal effects of credit on current enrolment  
(Probit model) 
 
Explanatory variables Whole sample Children aged 
 6-14 
Children aged
 15-18
Credit participation  (yes=1) -0.0032 -0.0139 0.0223
 (0.08) (0.66) (0.23)
Observations 483 286 197
Pseudo R-squared  0.30 0.24 0.22
Wald χ2(all coefficients=0) 111.31 37.17 50.18
Prob >χ2 0.000 0.001 0.000
Predicted probabilities at x-bar 0.858 0.965 0.596
Notes: 
Robust z statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; Column 1 is 
for the whole sample; Column 2 is for a sub-sample of children aged 6 to 14 (primary and lower secondary 
school ages); Column 3 is for a sub-sample of children aged 15 to 18 (high school ages). All the models were 
controlled for location dummies, distance to the nearest school (regarding to ages at different educational 
levels), child’s age, age squared, first born child dummy, gender, and household labour force, number of school-
aged children, parental highest education, household head’s gender, and pre-treatment income per capita and 
assets.     
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Table 3: Negative Binomial Regression (NB2) for credit impact on education gap 
Explanatory variables Whole sample Child aged 6-14 Child aged 15-18
Credit participation   -0.0313 0.0290 0.0168
(yes=1) (0.15) (0.09) (0.07)
Constant  -1.8093 3.9100 -6.6078
 (0.68) (1.45) (1.63)
Observations  483 286 197
Wald χ2 (all coefficients=0) 222.96 79.24 40.79
Prob >χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Alpha α(a) 1.3868
(5.85)**
1.2798  
(1.91)+
1.2193
(5.45)**
Notes: 
 (a)The alpha parameter, highly significant, means that the Negative Binomial regression is an appropriate 
approach. Model in column 2, the test of =0 is accepted at the 5% level, either the Poisson or NB can be 
applied in this case.  The estimated results by the NB and Poisson estimators are similar. Robust z statistics in 
parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; Column 1 is for the whole sample; 
Column 2 is for a sub-sample of children aged 6 to 14 (primary and lower secondary school ages); Column 3 is 
for a sub-sample of children aged 15 to 18 (high school ages). All the models were controlled for location 
dummies, distance to the nearest school, child’s age, age squared, first born child dummy, gender, and 
household labour force, number of school-aged children, parental highest education, household head’s gender, 
and pre-treatment income per capita and assets. 
 
Small loans are not an appropriate way of financing education investment. We observed 
from fieldwork that the loans of the poor in the peri-urban areas are often very short-termed, 
one year or less, especially loans from the informal credit sector; hence they are not used to 
support long-term investment in schooling. Moreover, in less developed countries, though 
many households borrowed, they were still credit-constrained because they were lent 
amounts smaller than those they demanded (Conning & Udry, 2007). Their loans were too 
small to finance long-term education investments,7particularly larger lump sums for tuition 
and registration fees for new schooling year (Mason & Rozelle, 1998). As a result, short and 
small loans affect only current education expenditure; bigger and longer-term loans are 
required to improve child enrolment and reduce education gap. This agrees with Islam (2010) 
who suggests that longer credit participation and larger loans could bring out benefits since it 
takes time to have effects.  
Higher schooling fees and foregone earnings of older children would change roles of 
credit participation. Intuitively, one may think that the effects at upper levels of education 
would be higher than at lower levels. In order to examine the varying effects at different age 
groups, we run separate models for different age groups: 6-14 (primary & lower secondary 
school) and 15-18 (high school). Results in Tables 2 and 3, columns 2 and 3, respectively 
show no evidence of significant impacts of microcredit on enrolment rate at any level from 6 
to 18 years old. This is also true for the education gap. The finding supports the previous 
discussion on trivial roles of small loans for child schooling. 
                                                 
7  For our surveyed households, an average loan size for education is about US$220, and is one of 
the smallest loan sizes of households compared to US$690 for other purposes (excluding 
consumption loans). 
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(b) The impacts of household credit on child schooling for boys and girls 
In developing countries parents are biased in favour of boys over girls in human capital 
investment such as education. The literacy gender gaps are empirically examined to be very 
high in all developing regions (Wils & Goujon, 1998). To examine whether the trend is true 
in peri-urban areas in Vietnam, one could partition the sample into boy and girl groups and 
estimate two separate regressions. Small subsamples, however, may reduce the statistical 
significance of the estimates. We therefore employ an alternative approach to test the equality 
of credit variable coefficients between the two groups. We include interactions between each 
variable with a dummy of children’s gender (boy=1) as additional variables. When the child 
gender dummy takes a value of zero (i.e. girls), all the interaction term coefficients equal 
zero, so the non-interacted coefficients provide effects for the girl group. On the other hand, 
child gender is one, the interacted term coefficients provide boy-girl difference estimates.  
Tables 4 and 5 report the impacts of credit participation on female child schooling and 
the boy-girl difference in the impact. For the whole sample, female children from borrowing 
households have 9% more probability of current enrolment than same-sex children from non-
borrowing households, but the effects are not statistically significant. For the younger group 
of primary and lower secondary education, the effect on girls’ enrolment is in the same 
direction and statistically significant at the 5% level.8 The effect difference between boys and 
girls is about (negative) 17% (i.e. the effect on boy schooling is about -8%), and it is strongly 
significant at the 1% level for the younger child group (Table 4). In short, when households 
borrowed, girls were better off but boys were worse off.  
 
Table 4: Marginal effect of credit on current enrolment by gender  
(Probit) 
 
Explanatory variables 
 
Children aged 6-18 Children aged 6-14
Girl Boy-girl
difference(a) 
Girl Boy-girl
difference(b) 
Credit participation  (yes=1) 0.0915 -0.1712 0.0496 -0.2276
 (1.41) (1.93)+ (2.37)* (3.54)**
Pseudo R-squared 0.35 0.39  
Wald χ2 (all coefficients =0) 135.74 84.70  
Prob >χ2 0.000 0.000 
Observations 483 286 
Notes: 
Robust z statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; (a) and  (b) are 
coefficients of interaction terms between the explanatory variables and child’s gender dummy (boy =1). All the 
models were controlled for location dummies, distance to the nearest school, child’s age, age squared, first born 
child dummy, gender, and household labour force, number of school-aged children, parental highest education, 
household head’s gender, and pre-treatment income per capita and assets. 
 
  
                                                 
8  Because of the small subsample of group aged 15 to 18, separate male and female groups are too 
small to run regressions. 
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Table 5: Impact of credit participation on education gap by gender  
(NB model) 
 
Explanatory variables Aged 6-18 Aged 6-14 
Girl Boy-girl
difference(a) 
Girl  Boy-girl
difference(b) 
Credit participation (yes=1) -0.2616 0.3726 -0.7496 1.1840
 (0.93) (0.94) (1.64)+ (1.98)*
Constant  -0.1659  4.2791
 (0.04)  (0.73)
Alpha (α) 1.3918
(5.96)** 
0.6967 
(1.57) 
Wald χ2 (all coefficients = 0) 292.74 131.02 
Prob >χ2 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 483 286 
 
Notes:  
Robust z statistics in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; and ** significant at 1%. (a) and (b) 
are coefficients of interaction terms between the explanatory variables and child’s gender dummy (boy =1). All 
the models were controlled for location dummies, distance to the nearest school, child’s age, age squared, first 
born child dummy, gender, and household labour force, number of school-aged children, parental highest 
education, household head’s gender, and pre-treatment income per capita and assets. 
 
The NB model estimates (Table 5) provide similar results of the effects by gender. For 
the whole sample, household credit participation leads to a decline of 0.26 points in education 
gap for girls but leads to an increase of 0.37 points [0.37=0.11-(-0.26)] in education gap for 
boys. Roughly, this finding implies that the effect is heterogeneous across child gender: Girls 
benefit from household credit participation, but the credit adversely affects on boys’ 
schooling.  
Furthermore, girls’ better academic performance is likely to help keep them at school 
longer and to receive more investment from their parents, that can be used to explain the 
positive impact on girls. Moreover, in the peri-urban areas in South Vietnam the traditional 
viewpoint of ‘valuing boys above girls or preferring boys to girls’ has been increasingly 
weakened in recent times. Though the effects are not highly significant, our finding is 
contrary to Islam and Choe (2009) that microcredit in Bangladesh has negative impacts on 
both boys and girls, and the impact is (negative) stronger for girls than for boys. It is also 
contrary to the finding of positively significant effects of microcredit on child education, 
especially the impact for boys (Pitt & Khandker, 1998). 
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(c) The impacts of different sources of household credit  
To evaluate whether different sources of credit matter in the impact on child schooling, we 
classify the borrowers into three groups: Households that borrowed from formal credit, 
households that borrowed from informal credit, and households that borrowed from both 
informal and formal credit.  
The estimates in Tables 6 and 7 show that formal credit positively affects child 
schooling, whereas informal credit adversely affects child schooling; and the effects of both 
informal and formal credit are stronger for the high school children group. To see whether the 
effects of informal and formal credit are different, we conduct the parameter test for 
difference between coefficients of formal credit and informal credit, and the test reveals that 
the difference is statistically significant for both current enrolment (Table 6) and education 
gap (Table 7). The difference, however, mostly comes from the group of high school-aged 
children because older children can participate in the labour force when their parents need 
more labour, especially labour without wages, to reduce business costs in order to repay high 
interest rate loans from informal credit. This finding is similar to Beegle, Dehijia and Gatti 
(2004) who find that children from households who borrowed from informal credit sources 
may have to leave school because their parents may be too poor to afford schooling fees and 
may need extra labour for their family businesses. In addition, short-term and small loans 
from informal credit are not suitable for greater schooling costs, especially high schools. 
 
Table 6: Marginal effects on enrolment status by types of credit  
(probit model) 
 
Explanatory variables Whole sample Children aged  
6-14 
Children aged 
15-18
Informal credit (yes=1) -0.0639 -0.0002 -0.1461
 (1.25) (0.01) (1.19)
Both sources of credit (yes=1) -0.0160 -0.0409 0.0037
 (0.33) (1.33) (0.03)
Formal credit (yes=1) 0.0637 -0.0121 0.1959
 (1.25) (0.39) (1.70)+
H0: βinformal = βformal (P-value) 0.019* 0.672 0.007**
Pseudo R-squared 0.31 0.25 0.25
Wald χ2 (all coefficients  = 0) 110.89 47.94 57.79
Prob >χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 483 286 197
 
Notes: 
Robust z statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; the reference 
group for credit types is non-borrowers. All the models were controlled for location dummies, distance to the 
nearest school, child’s age, age squared, first born child dummy, gender, and household labour force, number of 
school-aged children, parental highest education, household head’s gender, and pre-treatment income per capita 
and assets. 
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Table 7: Impact on education gap by type of credit (NB model) 
Explanatory variables Whole sample Children aged  
6-14 
Children aged 
15-18
Informal credit (yes=1) 0.1006 -0.1181 0.2852
 (0.44) (0.28) (1.02)
Both sources of credit (yes=1) 0.0995 0.2099 0.1184
 (0.40) (0.52) (0.44)
Formal credit (yes=1) -0.3411 0.0239 -0.3897
 (1.25) (0.06) (1.25)
Constant -1.4565 4.2060 -5.2948
 (0.57) (1.50) (1.35)
H0: βinformal = βformal (P-value) 0.084+ 0.730 0.035*
Alpha (α) 1.3488
(5.8)**
1.2806 
(1.91)+ 
1.1611
(5.3)**
Wald χ2 (all coefficients = 0) 231.47 88.34 50.89
Prob >χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 483 286 197
 
Notes:  
Robust z statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; 
Model in column 2, the test of α=0 is accepted at the 5% level, either the Poisson or NB can be 
applied in this case. The estimated results by the NB and Poisson estimators are similar. The reference 
group for credit types is non-borrowers. All the models were controlled for location dummies, 
distance to the nearest school, child’s age, age squared, first born child dummy, gender, and 
household labour force, number of school-aged children, parental highest education, household head’s 
gender, and pre-treatment income per capita and assets. 
 
(d) Does combination of credit with parental education (and with income) helps child 
schooling? 
This question is motivated by the existing literature, which has shown that credit itself is not 
able to help the poor effectively. For example, using Bangladesh data Pitt and Khandker 
(1998) found that girl schooling increased when households borrowed from Gameen Bank, 
but when households borrowed from other microcredit programs positive impact on girl 
schooling was not observed. Intuitively, the combination of credit and manifestation of 
children’s schooling benefits in the Grameen Bank group meetings, not microcredit itself, 
may account for the positive effects on children schooling. 
Higher educated parents are often longsighted for their children’s future livelihood, 
thus a combination of parental education and credit would accelerate the effects on child 
schooling. Therefore, to test whether parental education plays a role in accelerating the effect 
of credit usages in child education, we use an interaction term between credit and the highest 
parental education (of either husband or wife). The interaction term may capture the effect of 
parental education on child schooling within the borrowing household group. Moreover, 
families with more educated parents may have higher incomes; households with lower 
incomes among the poor may be too poor to afford child schooling costs, while less poor 
households are able to afford schooling if they have additional money from borrowing. 
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Therefore, one may think that credit to richer households in the poor group may have stronger 
effects on child schooling.  
We also use another interaction term between credit and pre-treatment income per 
capita to test whether among the borrower households, households with higher income have 
greater impacts on child schooling. The estimate results when estimating with inclusion of the 
interaction terms are presented in Table 8. The effects of both interaction terms are not 
statistically significant. The results suggest that amongst borrowing households children from 
higher educated and higher income parents also do not benefit from household credit for their 
schooling. In other words, there is no accelerator of parental education and initial income on 
the impact amongst poor borrowers because education of the poor parents is so low, only 5.5 
years (achieved just primary school level) relative to that of parents in general in Vietnam - 
about 8.9 years of education (VHLSS, 2006).9 Further, the return to schooling of lower 
education is very low (Doan & Gibson, 2009), hence the poor may not have been aware of 
educational benefits and may have had little motivation to increase their children’s education.  
 
Table 8: Effect of interaction terms between credit and parental education 
and credit and household income 
Explanatory variables dprobit model(a) NB model
Credit participation (yes =1) 0.7214 -1.2088
 (0.55) (0.27)
Credit participation*income per capita -0.0674 0.0849
 (0.58) (0.16)
Credit participation*highest  0.0035 0.0918
parental education (0.26) (1.26)
Constant  -1.4549
  (0.50)
Observations 483 483
Wald χ2 (all coefficients = 0) 114.17 224.50
Prob >χ2 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R-squared 0.30 
Alpha (α)  1.3849
(5.9)**
 
Notes:  
Robust z statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; (a)dprobit 
model estimates marginal effects. All the models were controlled for location dummies, distance to the nearest 
school, child’s age, age squared, first born child dummy, gender, and household labour force, number of school-
aged children, parental highest education, household head’s gender, and pre-treatment income per capita and 
assets. 
 
                                                 
9  This figure is estimated for general household head’s education, if the highest parental education 
of either husband or wife is estimated, the years of education would be higher.  
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Propensity Score Matching (PSM) estimation results 
In order to corroborate the Probit and NB estimation results, we apply PSM methods to (i) 
binary treatment (household borrowed or not) and (ii) multiple treatment effect models. The 
matching methods (kernel and radius) are used for the whole sample and for a sub-sample of 
households having children aged 6-18 years old. According to Bryson et al (2002), 
controlling variables used to estimate scores should affect both credit participation and child 
schooling outcomes. The variables include household head’s gender, head’s age, parental 
education, household head’s marital status, number of children aged 6-18 years old, 
household members aged 18-60 years old, initial income per capita in logarithm, initial assets 
in logarithm, and household location dummies.  
The estimates are presented in Tables 9 and 10. First, the PSM estimation using the 
binary treatment effect shows that credit participation does not strongly affect child schooling 
(Table 9). Roughly, the PSM estimates are consistent with the Probit and NB model 
estimates.  
Second, the multiple-treatment effect estimator in turn compares child schooling 
outcomes of informal borrowers and formal borrowers with that of the similar non-
borrowers.10 The estimates show that only formal credit affects the poor’s child schooling, 
participation in formal credit improves the likelihood of enrolment and reduces the education 
gap (Table 10). Effect comparison between the formal and informal borrowing groups, 
however, would be inappropriate due to different counterfactuals of both these groups. Direct 
comparison in the last column of Table 10 is used to overcome the problem of incomparable 
counterfactuals. The informal credit with a smaller (accumulated) loan amount per household 
(about US$500 on average) and with short-terms is not sufficient to support child schooling, 
whereas formal credit (with about US$920) is beneficial to child schooling.11 The multiple 
treatment effects analysis confirms the effects of household formal credit on child schooling. 
These findings also corroborate the Probit and NB model estimates. 
 
  
                                                 
10  The multiple treatments also help detect potential bias associated with unobservable characteristics 
in estimates of binary treatment effects (Lee, 2005, p. 119). If treatment level is increased (bigger 
loan size, here is the formal credit), then the effect will be stronger. Assume that our expectation is 
a positive effect, but the expectation is not confirmed by multiple ordered treatments, then the 
initial causal findings (from binary treatment) are questionable and may have been due to some 
unobserved attributes. On the other hand, if there is no hidden bias, the treatment effect of formal 
credit is higher than the effect of informal credit; in turn, the effect of informal credit is greater 
than the observed outcome for the non-borrowing group, controlling for the same set of covariates 
Xi. 
 
11  The average loan size is VND5,229 thousand (about USD317) and VND9,327 thousand (about 
USD566) for informal and formal credit respectively, since many households have more than one 
loans so the reported sizes of loan in the text are accumulated ones. Note that not all of these 
amounts are for education, but they are used for all purposes. 
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Table 9: The Average Treatment Effects using matching estimators 
Propensity score 
estimation stage 
Outcome of schooling Treated/ 
controls 
Kernel 
matching 
Radius 
matching
A subsample (households 
with children aged 6-18) 
Current Enrolment 370/84 0.017 
(0.054) 
0.031
(0.061)
Education Gap (year) 370/84 -0.167 
(0.297) 
-0.194
(0.300)
 
Whole sample 
Current Enrolment 379/98 0.010 
(0.052) 
0.010
(0.054)
Education Gap (year) 379/98 -0.146 
(0.282) 
-0.138
(0.292)
 
Notes:  
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses with 1000 repetitions, statistically significant at 10% (+); 5%(*); 
1%(**). Only few households (10 households) have more than or equal 4 children aged 6-18, to get balanced 
easier we group them into households having 4 kids. Controlling variables in the propensity score estimation 
(propensity score estimation with household level data):  Head’s gender, head’s age, parental highest education, 
marital status, children aged 6-18, members aged 18-60, initial income in log, initial assets in logarithm, location 
dummies. 
 
 
Table 10: The Average Treatment Effects using matching estimators with whole sample in 
propensity score estimation 
Outcome of schooling 
Informal credit 
vs  
Non-borrowers
Formal credit  
vs  
Non-borrowers 
Formal 
vs Informal 
ATTK ATTR ATTK ATTR ATTR
Current Enrolment -0.024  
(0.072)
-0.025  
(0.075)
0.140  
(0.058)*
0.105  
(0.052)* 
0.129  
(0.054)*
Education Gap (year) 0.023  
(0.395)
0.043  
(0.379)
-0.746  
(0.300)*
-0.665  
(0.293)* 
-0.745  
(0.273)**
 
Notes:   
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses with 1000 replications, statistically significant at 10% (+); 
5%(*); 1%(**). Controlling variables in the propensity score estimation: Head’s gender, head’s age, 
highest parental education, marital status, location dummies, number of children aged 6-18, number of 
members aged 18-60, initial income in logarithm, initial assets in logarithm, and head’s 
age*education. 
 
5.  Discussion and concluding remarks 
This study evaluates the impact of household credit on child schooling of the poor in the peri-
urban areas in Vietnam. The paper delivers the following conclusions: 
First, the small sized and short-term loans fail to help improve the poor’s child 
schooling. Second, the effect of household credit varies across child gender. Girls are more 
likely to receive more education investment and stay longer at school. The finding contrasts 
with the existing literature on the differences in boy-girl schooling impacts in South Asia, 
which indicates that microcredit benefits boys more than girls or affects girls more adversely 
than boys. Furthermore, evidence of the traditional view of ‘boys over girls’, even though it is 
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common in other similar developing countries, was not observed in this peri-urban area of 
HCMC, Vietnam. Girls’ better schooling performance helps keep them at school longer and 
hence they receive more investment in education from their parents.  
Third, a closer look at impacts of each credit source reveals that formal credit has 
brought beneficial effects to children’s education, while informal credit has failed to do so. 
Consequently, to improve child schooling in the long term needs to ease access to formal 
credit for the poor. Otherwise, the poor will continue to rely on informal credit and will end 
up in debt and will then pull their children out of school. Consequently, informal credit may 
exacerbate poverty in the long term rather than help the poor out of poverty. The poor are 
both income and credit constrained, so government interventions such as facilitating formal 
credit access are needed (Caucutt & Lochner, 2005). The poor need a ‘big push’ to break 
down the vicious circle of poverty.  
Providing subsidies or tuition exemption to all children is an impossible solution in 
poor countries like Vietnam since it may pose a burden on the government budget. An 
alternative is to target subsidies to low-income household child schooling. In fact, the current 
tuition exemption policy in Vietnam is ineffective to help poor children because the tuition 
accounts for just less than one third of total education costs, and almost all school fee 
exemptions are for primary schools regardless of parental income levels. Only 1% of the 
tuition exemption value is for children from poor households and 4.3% is for ethnic 
minorities (Behrman & Knowles, 1999, p. 230). Therefore, expanding preferred loans or fully 
tuition exemption to the poor, as well as providing subsidies for textbooks, uniforms, study 
materials and other school fees is a further necessary policy to encourage poor children to go 
to school and keep them at school longer.  
In Vietnam, the greater school expenditure, which is influenced by household budget 
constraints, may relate to obtaining higher quality schooling and better academic performance 
from participating in extra classes (Dang, 2007). Therefore, credit still has an important role 
in education investment. However, regulated tuition levels by the government could partly 
undermine the effects of credit on schooling. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Smoothed child enrolment ratio and education gap by age 
Child Age 
Enrolment rate (%) Education gap (years) 
Borrowers Non-borrowers Borrowers Non-borrowers 
6 83.3 82.2 0.01 0.00 
7 87.9 85.6 0.07 0.13 
8 91.3 88.1 0.13 0.26 
9 93.3 89.9 0.19 0.37 
10 94.4 91.6 0.26 0.48 
11 93.4 91.5 0.33 0.62 
12 89.4 87.9 0.50 0.91 
13 85.0 83.4 0.81 1.23 
14 79.5 77.8 1.07 1.52 
15 72.5 71.7 1.44 1.77 
16 63.5 63.9 1.89 2.23 
17 53.6 53.4 2.40 2.75 
18 44.6 46.2 2.81 3.36 
Notes: Bandwidth (a smoothing parameter) = 0.9 is chosen in the Lowess (locally weighted scatter-
plot smoothing estimator) command in Stata®. This information is used to graph Figure 1 and Figure 
2. 
 
Appendix 2: Mean and variance of education gap for children aged 6-18 
Variable Observations Mean Variance  Std.Dev Min Max 
Unconditional  483 1.122 5.087 2.255 0.000 12 
Conditional  483 1.145 2.190 1.480 0.019 12 
Source: Estimation from the authors’ survey. 
Tabulation of education gap for children from 6 to 18 years old 
Education gap Frequency Percent Cumulative 
0 31  6.42  6.42  
1 284  58.80  65.22
2 64  13.25  78.47
3 32  6.63  85.09
4 17  3.52  88.61
5 14  2.90  91.51
6 8  1.66  93.17
7 12  2.48  95.65
8 4  0.83  96.48
9 1  0.21  96.69
10 8  1.66  98.34
11 3  0.62  98.96
12 5  1.04  100.00
Total 483 100.00 100.00
Source: Estimation from the authors’ survey. 
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Appendix 3: Choice of Negative Binomial Models 
 
NB models fit two different parameterisations of the NB model:Negbin I or NB1: 
(Var(Y)=(1+ δ)E[Y] - a linear variance function), andNegbin II or NB2: 
(Var(Y)=E[Y].(1+α.E[Y]) - a version with quadratic variance. The NB2 has dispersion (ratio 
of variance/mean) for the ith observation equal to 1+α.E[Yi] i.e., the dispersion is a function 
of the expected mean of the counts for the jth observation: E[Yi]. The alternative 
parameterisation, NB1, has dispersion equal to 1 + δ; i.e. it is a constant for all observations. 
If alpha α = 0 (or delta δ =0) corresponds to dispersion = 1, thus it is simply a Poisson model. 
One may want to fit both parameterisations NB1 and NB2, and choosing either of them rely 
on larger (least negative) log pseudo likelihood. In most cases, however, both models will 
yield similar results, and the parameterisations will not significantly differ from one another. 
Thus, the choice of parameterisation is not important (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). 
 
A common approach to deal with the overdispersion for count data is to use the 
generalised linear model including NB (Hoef & Boveng, 2007) because the overdispersion 
parameter can vary across individuals so some variables can affect the location and scale 
parameters of the distribution, therefore, the generalised NB model which allows the different 
effects of different variables on the location and the scale of the distribution (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2009). In our case, we compare the regression statistics, e.g. Log pseudo likelihood, 
and see that both NB2 and generalised NB produced identical statistics. As a result, we apply 
only NB2 in the current research. 
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Appendix 4: Marginal effects of credit on current enrolment  
(weighted Probit estimates) 
 
Explanatory variables Whole sample Children aged 
 6-14 
Children aged
 15-18
Credit participation  (yes=1) -0.0028 -0.0116 0.0154
 (0.07) (0.51) (0.16)
Pre-treatment income capita in  0.0142 0.0583 -0.2567
Logarithm (0.21) (1.54) (1.42)
Pre-treatment asset in logarithm 0.0119 0.0015 0.0095
 (0.95) (0.27) (0.27)
Highest parental education (year) 0.0261 0.0127 0.0439
 (4.06)** (3.68)** (3.02)**
Household head’s gender  0.0341 0.0123 0.0529
(male=1) (0.91) (0.52) (0.63)
Number of children aged 6-18 -0.0674 -0.0306 -0.1419
 (3.75)** (2.67)** (3.46)**
Labour force -0.0060 0.0007 0.0025
 (0.67) (0.16) (0.10)
Child’s gender (male=1) -0.0900 0.0068 -0.3028
 (2.47)* (0.36) (3.69)**
Firstborn child (yes =1) 0.0228 -0.0331 0.1872
 (0.58) (1.23) (2.15)*
Child’s age 0.1791 0.0944 -0.1939
 (4.69)** (2.74)** (4.12)**
Child’s age squared -0.0090 -0.0046 
 (5.64)** (2.71)** 
Distance to the nearest school 0.0007 -0.0141 0.0366
 (0.05) (0.96) (1.00)
Observations 483 286 197
Pseudo R-squared  0.30 0.21 0.23
Wald χ2(all coefficients=0) 112.54 33.01 51.58
Prob >χ2 0.000 0.001 0.000
Predicted probabilities at x-bar 0.86 0.96 0.59
 
Notes: 
Robust z statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; Column 1 is 
for the whole sample; Column 2 is for a sub-sample of children aged 6 to 14 (primary and lower secondary 
school ages); Column 3 is for a sub-sample of children aged 15 to 18 (high school ages). All the models were 
controlled for location dummies.   
25 
Appendix 5: Credit impact on education gap  
(weighted NB estimates) 
 
Explanatory variables Whole sample Child aged 6-14 Child aged 15-18
Credit participation   -0.0173 0.0481 0.0111
(yes=1) (0.08) (0.14) (0.05)
Pre-treatment income  -0.0887 -0.8237 0.3785
capita in logarithm (0.25) (1.64) (0.96)
Pre-treatment asset  -0.0717 -0.0949 -0.0308
in logarithm (1.07) (0.93) (0.42)
Highest parental education  -0.0832 -0.1550 -0.0504
(years) (2.48)* (2.47)* (1.38)
Household head’s gender  -0.0915 -0.3405 0.0872
(male=1) (0.54) (1.03) (0.46)
Number of children  0.2021 0.2458 0.2040
aged 6-18 (2.57)* (1.54) (2.06)*
Labour force  0.0253 0.0374 -0.0243
 (0.50) (0.46) (0.46)
Child’s gender (male=1) 0.3967 0.3653 0.4309
 (2.32)* (1.22) (2.11)*
Firstborn child (yes =1) 0.1191 0.1748 -0.0300
 (0.61) (0.47) (0.14)
Child’s age 0.3501 0.2699 0.3557
 (8.77)** (4.56)** (2.99)**
Distance to the nearest  -1.0308 -1.5100 -1.1781
School (2.63)** (2.63)** (2.87)**
Constant  -3.3714 4.4675 -7.8268
 (1.01) (1.09) (1.70)+
Observations  483 286 197
Wald χ2 (all coefficients=0) 225.64 58.02 41.56
Prob >χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Alpha α 1.3862 
(5.71)**
1.5292
 (2.14)*
1.3862
 (5.71)**
 
Notes: 
Robust z statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; Column 1 is 
for the whole sample; Column 2 is for a sub-sample of children aged 6 to 14 (primary and lower secondary 
school ages); Column 3 is for a sub-sample of children aged 15 to 18 (high school ages). All the models were 
controlled for location dummies. 
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Appendix 6: Marginal effects on enrolment status by types of credit  
(weighted probit estimates) 
 
Explanatory variables Whole sample Child aged  
6-14 
Child aged 
15-18
Informal credit -0.0590 0.0029 -0.1390
 (1.14) (0.11) (1.13)
Both sources of credit -0.0161 -0.0344 -0.0093
 (0.33) (1.12) (0.08)
Formal credit 0.0662 -0.0093 0.1909
 (1.28) (0.29) (1.63)
Pre-treatment income capita  0.0218 0.0610 -0.2256
in logarithm (0.33) (1.83)+ (1.28)
Pre-treatment asset in log 0.0142 0.0014 0.0151
 (1.12) (0.26) (0.42)
Highest parental education  0.0245 0.0137 0.0434
 (3.99)** (4.36)** (3.07)**
Household head’s gender  0.0277 0.0024 0.0379
(male=1) (0.74) (0.12) (0.43)
Number of children aged 6-18 -0.0630 -0.0272 -0.1302
 (3.51)** (2.50)* (3.15)**
Labour force  -0.0080 0.0021 -0.0083
 (0.89) (0.50) (0.33)
Child’s gender (boy=1) -0.0895 0.0095 -0.2953
 (2.50)* (0.52) (3.57)**
First born child (yes=1) 0.0211 -0.0292 0.1710
 (0.54) (1.17) (1.92)+
Child’s age 0.1761 0.0896 -0.1806
 (4.68)** (2.79)** (3.83)**
Child’s age squared -0.0089 -0.0043 
 (5.62)** (2.76)** 
Distance to the nearest school 0.1062 0.0335 0.2395
 (1.78)+ (1.23) (1.53)
H0: βinformal = βformal (P-value) 0.024* 0.6633 0.012*
Pseudo R-squared 0.31 0.22 0.25
Wald χ2 (all coeffs=0) 112.64 43.91 58.68
Prob >χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 483 286 197
 
Notes: 
Robust z statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; All the models 
were controlled for location dummies. 
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Appendix 7:  Impact on education gap by type of credit  
(weighted NB estimates) 
 
Explanatory variables Whole sample Child aged  
6-14 
Child aged 
15-18
Informal credit 0.0893 -0.1129 0.2458
 (0.38) (0.26) (0.91)
Both sources of credit 0.1084 0.2479 0.1147
 (0.43) (0.60) (0.44)
Formal credit -0.3230 0.0149 -0.3755
 (1.16) (0.03) (1.21)
Pre-treatment income capita  -0.1383 -0.9054 0.3026
in logarithm (0.40) (1.75)+ (0.80)
Pre-treatment asset in  -0.0741 -0.0899 -0.0312
Logarithm (1.14) (0.84) (0.45)
Highest parental education  -0.0812 -0.1620 -0.0484
(years) (2.55)* (2.57)* (1.42)
Household head’s gender  -0.0454 -0.2746 0.1184
(male=1) (0.26) (0.84) (0.60)
Number of children aged 6-18 0.1962 0.2303 0.1853
 (2.50)* (1.45) (1.90)+
Labour force  0.0274 0.0196 -0.0024
 (0.57) (0.25) (0.05)
Child’s gender (boy=1) 0.4073 0.3147 0.4156
 (2.42)* (1.06) (2.07)*
First born (yes=1) 0.1339 0.1684 0.0046
 (0.69) (0.46) (0.02)
Child’s age 0.3439 0.2679 0.3048
 (8.67)** (4.55)** (2.58)*
Distance to the nearest school -0.9786 -1.4678 -1.0661
 (2.53)* (2.56)* (2.60)**
Constant -2.8717 5.1939 -6.4822
 (0.89) (1.20) (1.47)
H0: βinformal = βformal (P-value) 0.1104 0.7624 0.0520+
Alpha α 1.3526
(5.73)**
1.5237  
(2.13)* 
1.1393
(5.31)**
Wald χ2 (all coefficients = 0) 232.35 67.54 51.07
Prob >χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 483 286 197
 
Notes: 
Robust z statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; Model in 
column 2, the test of =0 is accepted at the 5% level, either the Poisson or NB can be applied in this case. The 
estimated results by the NB and Poisson estimators are similar. All the models were controlled for location 
dummies. 
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